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Abstract
The recent  literature  on  law and finance has drawn  qualitV  of the counltrics'  overall  uldicial  systems on the
attention  to the  importance  of creditor rights  in  use  of hankruptcV.
influenicinig  the  developmlenit  of financial  systems and  in  The authors find, correctinig  for overall financial
affectinig  firm  corporate  governance  and  financinig  development  anid  macroeconiomic  shocks,  that
patterns.  Recent  financial  crises  have  also  highliglhted the  hankruptcies  are highier  in Anglo-Saxoni  countries  and  in
importanlce  of  insolvency systems  to resolve corporate  market-orienlted  financial  systems clharacterized  by
sector finanicial  distress. The  literature  and  crises  have  weaker  and  multiple banking  relationships.  They also
emphasized  the complex  role  of creditor rights,  affectinig  find that greater judicial efficiency  is associated  with
not only the  efficiency  of ex-post  resolution  of distressed  more  LIse  of bankruiptcy,  buit that the combination  of
corporations,  but also influencinig  ex-antc  risk-taking  stronger  creditor rights with  greater judicial  efficiency
incenitives  anid  an  economy's  degree of entrepr-enieurship  Ieads to less  use.  The authlors  find that the  presence  of a
more  generally  "stay  on  assets"  leads to fewer  bankruptcies  indepenidelit
Claessecis  and Klapper  docLliiment  howv  often  of the efficiency  of the judicial  system. These  findings
bankruptcy  is  actUally  heing  used  for a panel  of 35  suggest that there are  important incentive  effects of
counltries.  Next they  investigate  the effects  of specific  insolvency systems  encouraging  less risky' behavior and
designi featres of insolvency regimes  in relatioii  to the  mor0e out-of-court  settlemncits.
This papcr-a  product  of Finance,  Development  Research  Group-is  part of a larger  effort  in the group  to uliderstand
corporate bankrtptcy.  Copies of the paper are available free from the World  lBank,  181 8 H  Street NW,  Washiligtoll,  D.C.
20433.  Please  contact  Agnes  Yaptenco,  room IvlC3-446,  tclephone  202-473-1823.  fax  202-522-1 155,  eilail  address
ayaptenico(yt worldbanik.org. Policy Research  Workiing Papers are also posted oii the Web at http://ccon.\worldbaa;k .org. -T-h
atithors mav  be contacted  at sti jn0l fee.uva. nl or lklapper(iwvorldbank.org.  July  2002.  (34  pages).
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developmient issues.  Ani object we of the series is to gLt the fiidinigs ont  luicklY., even  if the lpresentations  are less than fi/vli  polished.  The
papers carry the names of the au  lthors and shouild  be c-ited accordiPiivlv.  The findinzgs,  interpretations. and conclusions expr essed iii this
paper are enitirelv  those  of the aiuthors. TheY  do) not  necessaril  re  present  the vieu  of the  World Baink.  its  Executiite Directors,  or tle
counltries  the'  represenzt.
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assistance.1.  Introduction
The growing  literature  on law and finance,  starting with the work by La Porta,
Lopez  de  Silanes,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1997,  1998),  has  drawn  attention  to  the
importance of the strength of equity and creditor rights in influencing the development of
financial  systems  and  in affecting  firm  corporate  governance  and  financing  patterns.
This  literature  finds  that  greater  investor  protection  encourages  the  development  of
capital markets and that countries  that better protect creditors have more developed credit
markets.  Important aspects of the strength of creditor rights are the specific features of a
country's  insolvency  regime  and its  enforcement.  Recent  financial  crises have  further
highlighted the importance of well-functioning insolvency systems to prevent and resolve
corporate  sector financial  distress.  More generally, there  is increased interest globally in
the design  of insolvency  systems  from a point of resource  allocation,  efficiency,  and
stability as well as equality and fairness (see Stiglitz 2001 and Hart 2000 for reviews).
Insolvency  regimes  include  a  number  of features,  such  as  whether  the  law
provides for an automatic trigger when a company needs  to file for bankruptcy, who can
file for reorganization  or liquidation, the weight  given to the debtor, the creditors  (bank
loans,  trade  financing),  the  company's  management,  and  the  other  stakeholders  in
preparing  reorganization  proposals,  the  ability  of  management  to  stay  during  the
reorganization,  and whether  an automatic  stay of assets exists.  In these design  features,
an insolvency regime tries to balance several objectives, including protecting the rights of
creditors and other stakeholders  - essential to the mobilization of capital for investment
and  working  capital  and  other  resources  - and  obviating  the  premature  liquidation  of
viable firms.
2A good  insolvency  regime  should also prevent  managers  and shareholders  from
taking  imprudent  loans and lenders from giving loans with a high probability of default.
At the same time, the insolvency regime should provide for a degree  of entrepreneurship
in the economy more  generally.  An insolvency  regime  should  also deliver  an  ex-post
efficient  outcome,  in the  sense that the  highest total value  is obtained  for the distressed
firm  with  the  least  direct  costs  and  loss  in  going  concern  value.  The  working  of
countries'  judicial systems further complicates balancing these incentives.  In addition to
adequate  legal  rights,  there  is a  need  for  an  efficient  judicial  system  to enforce  these
rights, or at least to serve as a credible threat.
The  analytical  literature  and recent  crises  have  already  highlighted  the complex
role  of  creditor  rights  in  affecting  not  only  the  ex-post  resolution  of  distressed
corporations,  but  also  in  influencing  ex-ante  incentives  and  an  economy's  degree  of
entrepreneurship  more generally.  As the structure of economic production and the values
of stakeholders  are  continuously  changing  - often  in response  to recent  crises  - many
countries are also currently reevaluating the features of their creditor rights regimes and
how their insolvency  systems deal  with financially  distressed  firms.  This has proven to
be a complicated  area in many countries,  with discussions  on reform taking considerable
time.  Reforms may have been protracted in part because of the important implications of
any  changes  for  the  distribution  of wealth  and  control  in  an  economy,  raising  in turn
complex political economy issues.  Reforms  may have also been hampered by the lack of
empirical evidence  across countries on the effects of bankruptcy use and efficiency.
3While  more data are being collected on differences in bankruptcy  regimes across
countries,'  to date little is known on the effects of specific creditor right features and their
interaction  with the judicial  system and other country  characteristics.  The cross-country
empirical evidence  has largely been limited to the general  effects of creditor rights.  Even
here the  evidence  has been mixed,  with some finding only limited or no significance  of
the  aggregate  strength  of creditor  rights  on  financial  development.  Furthermore,  the
precise  channels through  which a country's  institutional  inheritance  affects its financial
development and what aspects of legal  systems are most important for firm financing are
still being investigated.  Much research is being conducted, for example, on what aspects
of a Common  (Civil)  Law  heritage  help  explain that  such  countries  have  more  (less)
developed  equity  and  financial  markets.  More  robust  tests  and  indirect  measures  are
being  used  to  explore  the  channels  through  which  countries'  legal  and  institutional
"structure" matter.2
One indirect measure  that may help shed light on these  channels  might be  the
actual  use  of bankruptcy  as  a means  to  resolve  financial  distress  and  the  relationship
between  actual  use  and  a  country's  institutional  features,  including  its  creditor  rights,
legal  heritage  and  judicial  system.  To  date,  however,  it  is  not  known  how  often
bankruptcy is actually being used in countries around the world.  Neither is it known why
its usage  varies  by country characteristics  like  differences  in legal  systems,  accounting
l  The World  Bank, Asian Development  Bank,  and Inter-American  Development  Bank
have  started to document the detailed features of bankruptcy  systems in many countries.
The World Bank has also undertaken  a review of desirable  principles  and guidelines  for
bankruptcy systems.
2 See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, Beck,  Levine and Loayza,  2000, Berglof
and Von Thadden,  1999,  Coffee,  2000, La Porta et al., 2002,  Rajan and Zingales,  1999
and 2002, and Stulz and Williamson,  2001.
4standards  and  regulatory  frameworks,  as  well  as  differences  in  the  development  of
financial and capital markets and macroeconomic  conditions.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  explore  the  relative  importance  of country
characteristics  and the effect of different types of creditor rights that can help explain the
relative  use  of bankruptcy.  For this, we  collect  from  various  government  and private
sources a unique dataset of the number of commercial  bankruptcy filings in 35 countries.
As shown in Appendix 2, almost all countries in our sample have laws protecting secured
creditor rights and have bankruptcy laws permitting both liquidation  and restructuring of
distressed  firms.  There is considerable variation,  however, in how frequently these laws
are resorted to through formal bankruptcy filings.  The data on actual bankruptcies  allows
us  to  investigate  which  legal  design  features  and  macro,  financial,  and  other  country
characteristics  affect the likelihood that creditors  use formal  bankruptcy procedures  as a
means of resolving corporate  financial distress.  To our knowledge, this paper is the first
attempt to identify empirically reasons for the use of bankruptcy across countries.
We  find,  correcting  for  overall  financial  development  and  macroeconomic
shocks,  that  bankruptcies  are  higher  in  common-law  countries  and  in  market-oriented
financial  systems.  We also find that greater judicial  efficiency is associated  with more
use of bankruptcy, but that the combination  of stronger  creditor rights - both aggregated
and evaluated separately by specific features - and greater judicial  efficiency leads to less
use of bankruptcy.  Interestingly,  we find that the presence  of a "stay on assets" leads to
fewer bankruptcies independently of the efficiency of the judicial system.  These findings
suggest  that  there  are  important  ex-ante  incentive  effects  of  insolvency  systems,
including  encouraging  less  risky  behavior  and  more  out-of-court  settlements.  But  our
5findings  also  suggest  that efficient legal mechanisms  themselves may help corporations
achieve speedy resolutions of financial  distress.  In tum, these finding may shed light on
the  debate  of what  are  the  precise  channels  through  which  a  country's  institutional
structure affects its financial development.
2.  Previous Literature and Hypotheses
The central role played by law and regulatory institutions  in the  development  of
financial  markets  in  general  and  in  corporate  finance  in  particular  has  received
considerable  attention in recent years.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998)  examine  cross-country  differences  in  the  quality  of  laws,  regulations,  and
enforcement,  including  creditor  rights.  They  document  considerable  variation  in  the
protection offered to creditors and minority shareholders  across countries.  They also find
a significant association between the legal origins of a country and the quality of investor
protection.  In particular, their findings show that common law countries  (Anglo-Saxon)
generally provide the best investor protection  whereas civil law origin (French, German,
and Scandinavian)  countries provide the least investor protection.
Importantly,  the  literature  on  law  and  finance  has  drawn  attention  to  the
importance  of equity  and  creditor  rights  in  influencing  the  development  of financial
systems and in affecting  firm corporate  governance,  ownership,  and financing  patterns.
A number of papers have reported significant relationships between the legal framework
of a country  and  its financial  development  and economic  growth and between  investor
6protection  and  legal  origin  and  various  corporate  governance  issues,  such  as  firm
dividend payout policies, firm valuation,  and corporate ownership  structures.3
To  investigate  these  relationships  in  the  case  of creditor  rights,  La  Porta  et  al.
(1998)  created  an index  of CREDITOR  RIGHTS  consisting  of the summation  of four
dummy variables,  with four the highest possible score.  The dummy variables they report
are: TIME,  equal to 1 if the timetable  for rendering  a judgment is less than 90 days, and 0
otherwise;  MANAGER,  equal  to  1 if incumbent  management  does  not  stay  during  a
restructuring  or bankruptcy,  and 0 otherwise;  STAY,  equal to  1 if there  is no automatic
stay  on assets,  and  0  otherwise;  CREDITOR,  equal  to  1 if secured  creditors  have  the
highest priority  in payment,  and  0 otherwise.  La Porta et al.  (1997)  reports  a positive
relationship  between the  ratio of domestic debt to GDP  and this aggregate  creditor right
index, although  the  creditor  rights variable  has  only  10%  significance.  Controlling  for
the country's  legal  origin  (Anglo-Saxon,  French,  Germanic,  and  Scandinavian)  and the
existence  of the rule of law in the country,  the significance of the creditor rights variable
actually disappears.
Neither La Porta et al. (1997) nor the other papers on law and finance investigated
the effects of each specific  sub-index of the Creditor Rights index on the development of
the  credit  markets.  We  may  expect,  however,  that  there  are  considerable  differences
between  the  effects  of each  specific  creditor  rights  on  firm  and  creditor  behavior.  A
stipulation  in the  insolvency  law that provides  creditors  with  the  right of no automatic
stay  on  assets,  for example,  provides  creditors  with  some  bargaining  power  that  may
3See Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000, La Porta et al.,  1997 and 2002, Rajan and Zingales,
1995 and 1998,  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer,  1999,  and Demirgiiu-Kunt  and
Maksimovic, 1998.
7allow them to more easily negotiate debt restructuring out of court.  At the same time, the
absence  of an automatic  stay  may lead  to  a creditor race  to  seize  assets,  thus possibly
accelerating  the possibility  of financial  distress  and  bankruptcy.  Interestingly,  work  at
the global  level on developing principles  and guidelines  for an effective  insolvency  and
creditor right system suggests that there should preferably  be an automatic  stay on assets
for  at least  some initial  period (World  Bank,  2001).  This differs  from  La Porta  et  al.
(1998)  whom  consider  in constructing  their  index  the  absence  of an automatic  stay  a
positive  creditor rights feature.  This suggests that there are some differences  of opinion
on what constitute  desirable  creditor rights features,  which in turn may relate to our lack
of understanding  on how certain creditor rights features affect actual bankruptcy use.
The  presence  in  the  law  of secured  creditor  priority  and  absolute  priority  of
claims  in  bankruptcy  or  restructuring  (i.e.,  senior  creditors  are  paid  first,  then junior
creditors,  followed  finally by shareholders  if any residual  remains)  is another  example.
Such priority may deter ex-ante risky financial behavior and thus reduce the likelihood of
financial  distress.  Such feature  can also help  overcome  creditor  coordination problems
when  a  corporation  is  in  restructuring.  At  the  same  time,  if the  law  stipulates  that
shareholders  receive  nothing  in  bankruptcy,  a  firm  may  attempt  to  delay  or  avoid
bankruptcy,  including undertaking more high-risk projects when the corporation starts to
run into financial  distress.  Depending  on whether  the insolvency law at the  same time
stipulates  whether managers  have  to automatically  leave  when a firm  is in bankruptcy,
incentives will vary whether managers  will act or not on behalf of shareholders.
These  discussions  show  that  each  of the  specific  creditor  right  features  may
influence  firm and creditor behavior differently and what constitutes  a desirable  creditor
8right feature may depend on circumstances  or objectives.4 While we may expect the use
of bankruptcy  to  vary  with  the  strength  of (specific)  creditor  rights,  this  will also  be
influenced by the ability of creditors to use these rights, which  in turn will depend on the
efficiency  of the judicial  system.  Modigliani  and Perotti  (2000)  draw attention to the
finding  that  when  a country's  enforcement  regime  is  unreliable,  transactions  may  be
carried out through  some form of private enforcement.  La Porta et al. (1997) show the
importance of the judicial system, in addition to formal legal rights, for financial market
development.  Berkowitz,  Pistor and Richard  (2000)  argue  that the quality of laws,  as
often measured  by the country's  legal  origin, is only a crude proxy for the effectiveness
of legal systems - instead it is the effective enforcement of laws rather than the quality of
laws that matters.5
Whether  courts  are  asked  to  help  resolve  financial  distress  may  also  similarly
depend  on  the  efficiency  of the  judicial  systems.  Creditors  may  be  more  likely  to
undertake the costs of filing for bankruptcy  if they are able to effectively use the courts in
the case of default.  A country with strong and efficient legal enforcement might thus see
more  frequent  use of the  statutory provisions  provided in the  legal  code.  At the  same
time, if enforcement  is strong, we may expect debtors and creditors to try to avoid risky
4 Furthermore, while the work by La Porta et al. (1998) provides some detail on creditor
right features, obviously there are many other aspects in which insolvency regimes differ
across countries.  The work at the World Bank on developing  Principles  and  Guidelines
for  Effective  Insolvency  and  Creditor  Rights  Systems  mentions,  for  example,  35
principles  countries  could  adopt  or pursue.  The effects  of these  more  detailed  design
features  may  in  turn  be  reflected  in  the  relative  use  of bankruptcy  across  countries.
Unfortunately, data on more detailed features are not available in a systematic way.
5 For transition  economies,  Pistor, Raiser and  Gelfer  (2000) show that the laws on the
books  have  limited  effects  on  financial  market  development,  but  that  measures  of
effective  enforcement  do.  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1999  and  2002)  also provide  evidence
that argues for factors other than legal origin as predictors of stock market growth.
9behavior,  thereby  reducing  the  chances  of  financial  distress  and  bankruptcy.
Alternatively,  if enforcement  is  weak,  debtors  and  creditor  may  try  to  work  out  a
situation of financial distress through private  negotiations,  since the transaction  costs of
using an inefficient enforcement system may be too high.  At the same time,  in countries
with  weak judicial  systems,  debtors  may engage  in more  risky financial  behavior,  thus
leading  to  more  financial  distress.  Corporate  financial  distress  provides  one  specific
setting  to  examine  the  effects  of the  efficiency  of the  judicial  system  relative  to the
formal  laws.  For  example,  Claessens,  Djankov,  and  Klapper  (2002)  found that  in  a
sample of East Asian countries,  creditors are more likely to incur the costs of bankruptcy
if ex-ante  creditor  rights  and  ex-post judicial  efficiency  indicate  a  likely  recovery  of
losses.
This suggests  that variations  in enforcement  efficiency  should cause  differences
in the use of formal bankruptcy  procedures, even if bankruptcy  laws are broadly similar.
The impact of the (lack of) judicial efficiency may also vary by specific  creditor right as
the  need  for enforcement  varies.  The absence  of an automatic  stay on assets may,  for
example,  be very valuable to creditors when the judicial  system  is weak as it can  force
debtors  to negotiate out of court.  But in a strong judicial  system, the  absence  of a stay
may be more beneficial as it preserves the going concern value of firms in reorganization,
thereby reducing  the  chances of eventual  bankruptcies.  More  generally,  the features of
an insolvency system are designed to deal with specific issues, such as too risky behavior
by  debtors,  creditor races  to  grab  assets,  the  preservation  of going  concern  value,  the
maintenance  of priorities  among claims to preserve  incentives  for monitoring,  etc.  The
10degree  to which the effectiveness  of a specific feature depends on the judicial system and
its consequent relationship with actual bankruptcy use is likely to differ.
In addition  to exploring  the  relationship  between  the use of bankruptcy  and  the
features  of creditor right regimes,  we also want to investigate the relative  role of bank-
oriented  versus  market-oriented  financial  systems.  As  discussed  by  Allen  and  Gale
(1997),  Levine  (1999),  and  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Levine  (1999),  countries  differ  in the
structure of their financial  system.  The relation of the orientation of the financial system
with the use of bankruptcy is unclear, however.  In bank-oriented economies,  firms often
depend on  a single,  powerful  banking  relationship  as a primary  source  of all  forms of
extemal  finance, which  may include both debt and equity financing.  In market-oriented
economies,  firms  often  have  multiple  bank  lenders  and  widely  held  publicly  traded
equity.  We  would  expect that the  arms-length  banking  relationships  found  in market-
oriented systems present more incentive for creditors to use formal bankruptcy measures
to coordinate among  creditors.  As shown in Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), firms in the
United  States that use in-court bankruptcy proceedings  have a smaller percentage  of debt
owed to banks and a greater number of lenders.
This  suggests  that creditors  in  market-based  economies  may benefit  more  from
those aspects of bankruptcy  law that aim to overcome  collective  action problems  among
creditors.  Also,  firms  in bank-oriented  economies  tend to have closer relationships with
their  primary  bank  and  the  bank  may  also  have  an  equity  investment  in  the  firm.
Creditors in bank-oriented  economies  may therefore have  less  need or be less inclined to
use  formal  (and  costly)  bankruptcy  filings  to  resolve  financial  distress.  Evidence  for
Japan  and  Germany  indeed  suggests  that  borrowers'  main  banks  not  only  help avoid
11costly financial distress, but also act as coordinator of financial support and restructuring
in times of financial distress.  On the other hand, since firms in bank-oriented economies
have typically greater percentages of bank debt, we might expect higher leverage  to lead
to  a  higher  number  of bankruptcies  in  bank-oriented  systems.  Also,  in bank-based
systems there  may be more scope  for conflicts  of interest between  the role  of banks  as
creditor  and  as  equityholder.  More  generally,  a bank-oriented  system may have  more
scope  for  perverse  relationships  between  financial  institutions  and  corporations.  For
example, Claessens,  Djankov,  and Klapper  (2002) show that firms in East Asia with a
bank  as  their controlling  shareholder  are  less  likely  to  use  bankruptcy  as  a means  of
resolving financial distress.
Furthernore,  we  want  to  test  whether  countries  with  more  significant  new
business entry restrictions  have fewer bankruptcy filings.  The lack of entry would make
for  a  less  competitive  industry,  which  in  turn  could  imply  fewer  exits,  as  discussed
extensively in the industrial organization literature (i.e., Hopenhayn,  1992).6  In previous
literature,  Dunne,  Roberts,  and  Samuelson  (1988)  find  that entry  and  exit rates  within
industries are highly correlated - industries with higher than average  entry rates tend to
also have higher than average  exit rates.  We also want to explore the relationship of the
distribution of firm size with the occurrence  of bankruptcy.  On one hand, a larger share
of small firms may reduce the number of bankruptcy relative to the total number of fimns,
as small firms are less likely to incur the cost of a formal bankruptcy procedure.  On the
other hand,  small firms may be more risky  and consequently  a large share of small firms
in  an economy  may  raise  the  relative  number  of bankruptcies.  In addition  to  these
6 For a review of the literature  see Caves (1998).
12variables, we also expect that the general development of the country, the occurrence of a
systemic banking crisis,  and the  level of economic growth will affect  the relative use of
bankruptcy.
3.  Data and Summary Statistics
The  number  of  total  commercial  bankruptcy  filings  was  collected  from
government and private  sources around  the world  for all  available  years  between  1990-
1999.7  We  include the  sum of all firms  that file for liquidation or reorganization  under
the bankruptcy  code.  This measures the total use of the bankruptcy  law and the judicial
system  to  resolve corporate  financial  distress.  In order  to  compare  the  relative  use of
bankruptcy  cross-country,  we normalize  the number of bankruptcy  filings.  We  use  the
total number of firms, as provided by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer
(2002)  and official country statistical  handbooks.8 Tables  1 and 2 show some  summary
statistics for the countries in our sample panel.
To  explain  the  relative  use of bankruptcy,  we  include  as  explanatory  variables
measures  of macroeconomic  performance,  financial  structure,  efficiency  of judicial
system, other institutional  measures, and the specific creditor rights discussed above.  We
expect  that  the  number  of failed  firms  depends  on  a  country's  current  and  expected
7  See  Appendix  1 for the  country  sources.  In  part  because,  there  is  variation  across
countries  in  the  definition  and  implications  of  bankruptcy,  we  include  all  legal
proceedings  designed to either liquidate or rehabilitate an  insolvent  firm.  Results were
qualitatively  robust  to  analyzing  only  liquidation  procedures  for  those  countries  that
identified those numbers separately.
8  For  seven  countries,  only the total  number  of manufacturing  firms is  available.  For
these  countries  we  extrapolate  the  total  number  of firms  by  sector  and  legal  origin
(English,  French,  etc.).  All  empirical  results  are  robust  to  the  exclusion  of  these
countries.
13economic  performance,  as  measured  by the  performance  and  growth  of GDP.  We
therefore  include lagged  real GDP per capita in US$, RGDPPCt .,  and the lagged  1-year
growth rate of real GDP, GDPGt.1.9 We expect countries experiencing negative growth to
have higher rates of defaults.  We also control for periods of systemic banking crises with
data from Caprio and Klingebiel (2000), D_CRISISt.1, which may indicate periods of not
only economic  slowdown but also  periods during which borrowers  are more constrained
in  finding  additional  bank  financing  and  more  likely to  file  for  bankruptcy.  We  also
include  lagged real  interest rates  as a measure of the cost  of financing,  RINTERESTt.1,
expecting to find that higher real interest rates are associated with more defaults.
To measure the relative orientation of banks versus equity markets, we include a
dummy variable provided  by Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine  (1999), D_BNKORIENT,  that
identifies  countries  as  market-  versus  bank-oriented,  depending  on  the  relative
importance  of intermediated  (bank)  versus  direct  (capital)  financial  markets.  To  test
whether countries with more significant entry restrictions have  fewer bankruptcy filings,
we use the data collected in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer (2002)  on
the restrictiveness  of entry-the time to establish a new business-to test whether entry
and exit rates tend to be correlated  across countries.  This variable  is called  TIME.  We
also test for the effect of a higher concentration  of SMEs, measured  as the percentage of
employment attributed to SMEs collected by Klapper and Sulla (2002) and denoted here
by SME_SHARE.
9 The subscript, t, indicates a time series.  All other variables  are constant over time, but
vary by country.
14We  include  dummies  to  indicate  legal  origins  - FRENCH,  ENGLISH,
GERMAN,  SCANDINAVIAN,  and  TRANSITION.  These  origins  proxy broadly  for
creditor  rights,  with  English,  common  law  countries  being  regarded  as more  creditor-
friendly,  whereas  French,  civil  law  countries  are  regarded  as  more  debtor-friendly.
However,  these  variables  also  capture  other  aspects,  including  the  adaptability  of the
legal system  and elements  of the efficiency of the legal  system.  In addition to including
legal  origins, which are  exogenously  determined,  we expect the  implementation of laws
to  be  a  significant  factor  and  therefore  also  include  an  index  of the  efficiency  and
integrity of the legal  environment, RULE  of LAW,  as reported for most countries by La
Porta  et  al.  (1998)  and  for  transition  economies  by  Pistor  (2000).  As  an  alternative
measure regarding the efficiency  of the judicial  system,  we use a "legality"  index, which
is the weighted average  of indexes provided by Business  International Corporation of the
Efficiency of the Judiciary,  Rule of Law, Corruption,  Risk of Expropriation,  and Risk of
Contract Repudiation  (Berkowitz, et al.,  2002).Io
Finally,  we  use  the  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998)  index  of CREDITOR  RIGHTS,
consisting  of  the  summation  of  four  dummy  variables,  RESTRICTIVE
REORGANIZATION,  NO AUTOMATIC  STAY ON ASSETS,  SECURED CREDITOR
PRIORITY,  and  MANAGEMENT  DOESN'T  STAY,  with  a  highest  possible  score  of
four."  l  We also use the individual  sub-indexes.
° This index is unavailable  for transition economies.
l Almost all countries have formal liquidation and reorganization  laws (see Appendix 2).
154.  Empirical Results
We set up the regressions  as a panel of country and years.  Since  we do not have
the  same  number of years  in which  we have  observation  on bankruptcy rates  for each
country (Table 2), we have an unbalanced panel of 273 observations.  Our first regression
results are shown  in Table  3.  The specification  used always includes the  level of GDP
per capita,  lagged  GDP  growth  rate,  a dummy  for whether  the  country  experienced  a
systemic financial  crisis  during the period, and the real  interest rate.  Column (1)  shows
the base regression  results.  We  find that countries  with higher  levels of real  GDP  per
capita have higher uses of bankruptcy.  This suggests that greater overall development  is
consistent  with  greater judicial  efficiency  and more  court usage.  Lagged  GDP  growth
rate  has the expected negative  sign, and is statistically  significant at the  10% level.  The
systemic crisis dummy has the expected positive  sign, but is not statistically significant.
The  real  interest  variable  has  a  positive  sign  as  well,  but  is  also  not  statistically
significant.
The  next regression,  Column  2,  includes  the  market  orientation  variable.  The
significantly  positive  coefficient  on  D_MKTORIENT  shows  that  bankruptcy  use  is
greater in  countries with more  use of market  financing  and less in bank-based  systems.
This supports our hypothesis that countries in which banks have closer relationships with
borrowing  firms  have  less  dispersed  creditors  and  thus  less  need  for  court-driven
coordination  among creditors,  and are  less likely to use bankruptcy to resolve  financial
distress.
Table 3, Column 4, shows the effect of the ease of new business entry on the use
of bankruptcy.  We find a significantly positive relationship  between the time required to
16operate  a  new  business  and  the  use  of bankruptcy  - countries  in  which  it  is  more
restrictive and difficult to open a new business also have lower rates of bankruptcy.  One
explanation is that both procedures  - registering  a new business  and filing for bankruptcy
- are dependent on an efficient public sector, including an efficient judicial  system.  This
seems not generally the case, however.  Germany, for example,  which has a high index of
judicial  efficacy,  requires a relatively  long time to start a new business, 90 working days,
and has a relatively low average  bankruptcy  rate of 1.03%  over the period.  In contrast,
Canada,  which also has a high level of judicial efficiency,  requires only 2 days to start a
new business and has a relatively high average bankruptcy rate of 2.96%.  The significant
relationship may rather  mean that countries that allow easy business  entry permit a more
natural  "learning-curve",  during which  relatively  more firms  are expected  to fail, while
countries  that require,  for example,  more documentation  of qualifications  and  financial
backing,  may  have  lower  rates  of  business  defaults.  Another,  complementary
explanation  is  that  countries  which  restrict  competition  through  entry  also  assure  the
profitability  and  allow  the  survival  of less  efficient  firms,  thus  keeping  the  overall
bankruptcy rate low.
In  Column  5 we  include  the  share  in  total  employment  by  small  and  medium
sized  enterprises  (SMEs).  This  variable  is  collected  from a variety  of sources  over  a
number of years  and as such  is perhaps  not as robust  an indicator  of the  importance  of
small firms to the  economy.  It is, however,  very significantly  negative,  suggesting that
the SMEs are less likely to use bankruptcy courts.  This may be because of the high fixed
costs  involved  in  using  legal  proceedings  and  courts,  which  makes  using  formal
bankruptcy  less  efficient  for  SMEs.  Furthermore,  SMEs  may  rely  more  on  a  smaller
17number of creditors,  making out of court negotiations  more  likely.  Also,  SNIE failures
may more likely reflect "economic" distress, which suggests that SMEs that fail have less
need  for  bankruptcy  procedures  to  preserve  going  concern  value  through  formal
distribution of firm assets. 12
Finally, in Column  5 we introduce  individual  country-dummies  and we find that
the  significance  of some of the variables  changes.  In particular,  the  level  of GDP  per
capita and the lagged  output  growth rates  are not  longer  statistically  significant,  which
can  be  expected  as  the  country  dummies  control  for  much of each  country's  overall
macroeconomic  environment.  The  systemic  crisis  dummy  becomes  statistically
significant, however, while the real interest rate keeps its positive, but still insignificant
sign.
We next introduce the legal variables for our complete sample.  We start with the
relationship between legal origins and bankruptcy rates.  Table 4, Column (1)  shows that
countries  with French and German civil  law codes  - which are typically  categorized  as
having weaker creditor rights - use bankruptcies  significantly  less than countries  in the
common law orientations.13 In addition, we find that transition countries have lower use
of bankruptcy,  perhaps  because  their  legal  codes  and judicial  systems  are  newer  and
because creditors  and borrowers have less experience  using the courts to resolve distress.
Column (2) includes the index of rule of law, which proxies for the efficiency of the legal
environment.  We  find  this  measure  to  be  significantly  positively  related  to  the
12  This result may also be partially  explained by the high correlation between  the size of
the SME sector and legal origins as shown in Klapper and Sulla (2002).
13 The exception is Scandinavia, which has significantly higher bankruptcies than English
countries,  although this  may be  a result  of Scandinavia's  recent banking  crisis  and the
fact that all Scandinavian countries are high-income.
18occurrence  of bankruptcy  - the  greater  the  likelihood  of  a  creditor  speedily  and
successfully collecting in the court,  the more likely creditors  are to use formal and costly
bankruptcy  proceedings  in the  case of default.  When  we  include both legal  origin and
rule  of law,  Column  (3),  we  find  that  both  are  statistically  significant,  but  that  the
coefficient for the rule of law variable  loses some of its significance.  This can probably
be explained  by the correlation  between the legal  family of a country and the efficiency
of its legal system (as already noted by La Porta et al.  (1998)).14
Next  we  study  the  importance  of  the  overall  strength  of  creditor  rights  by
including the  index  CREDITOR  RIGHTS  in the regression  in Column 4.  Interestingly,
the  overall  strength  of  creditor  rights  is  not  statistically  significant  related  to  the
occurrence of bankruptcy across countries.  An argument could be made that on one hand
stronger  rights  deter  bankruptcy  - as  debtors  and  creditors  both  avoid risky  financing
patterns and prefer to negotiate  out of court in times of financial  distress.1 5 On the other
hand,  stronger rights allow bankruptcy  procedures  to be used more effectively.  The net
effect may be that the aggregate creditor rights are not statistically significantly related to
the occurrence  of bankruptcy.  When we  also include the  degree of judicial  efficiency  in
Column  5,  we  find  that  the  coefficient  for  creditor  rights  remains  statistically
insignificant.  This provides  some support  for the hypothesis  that the overall  strength of
creditor rights has two offsetting  effects:  the deterrence part,  with a negative relationship
14 As a robustness check, we substitute the rule of law index with the legality index for all
regressions  and  we find  that our results  remain equally significant.  However,  for these
regressions  we  cannot  include  the  transition  countries  as  the rule  of law  index  is  not
available.
15 However,  often, even in the US, when parties reach an agreement outside of court they
frequently formally  file for bankruptcy to avoid future contract disputes.
19with  bankruptcy  use,  and  the  actual  usage  part,  with  a  positive  relationship  with
bankruptcy  use.  The  latter relationship  is picked  up in  part in this regression  by the
efficiency of the legal system, making the coefficient for creditor rights more negative.
Thus  far our  interpretation  is based  on  an analysis  of the  strength  of aggregate
creditor  rights,  and  not yet  its individual  components.  As discussed before,  each  of the
four separate creditor rights may have a different effect on the occurrence of bankruptcy,
which may explain why we did not find  a statistically  significant  effect of the aggregate
creditor  rights  index  on  bankruptcy  use.  We  therefore  next  analyze  the  relationship
between  the  four  separate  indexes  and the  occurrence  of bankruptcy,  with  regression
results  reported  in  Table  5.16  Of the  four  subindexes,  one  is  statistically  significantly
positive - RESTRICTIVE  REORGANIZATION  in Column  1 - and  one  is  statistically
significant  negative - NO AUTOMATIC  STAY ON  ASSETS,  in Column  2.  The other
two  subindexes  are  not  statistically  significant.  This  suggests  that  the  deterrence  and
actual  usage  effects  vary by creditor  rights.  The presence  of restrictions  for  going into
reorganization,  such  as  creditors'  consent,  seems  to  provide  creditors  with  more  legal
tools and lead  to  more bankruptcy.  The  ability of secured  creditor  to  seize assets  even
when a firm has  filed for reorganization  (no automatic stay),  in contrast,  seems  to deter
bankruptcy.  This  suggests  that  the  presence  of an  automatic  stays  aimed  at avoiding
creditor races  strengthens  the  overall  leverage  of creditors.  It is interesting  that priority
of secured  creditors  is not significant.  This may  indicate  that a priority  creditor  rights
feature deters risky behavior and thus reduces  the probability of bankruptcy.  It may also
16 These regressions  exclude transition  economies since data on the subindices  of creditor
rights is unavailable.  As a result, the number of observations drops from 273 to 252.
20be that laws permitting secured  creditors rights are less important than having a business
environment  that allows, for example,  easy registering  of collateral and  the presence  of
courts which speedily enforce  secured claims (before the creditor can liquidate the asset).
Note that in these regressions  we control for the effects of the judicial efficiency  on the
likelihood of  bankruptcy by including our legality variable that has consistently a positive
relationship with the number of bankruptcies.
To further  test the  interaction  between  the effects of judicial  efficiency  and the
individual and aggregate creditor rights, we run a set of regressions where we include, in
addition  to the creditor  rights (sub-)  indexes  and the judicial  efficiency  index,  also the
interaction between the two indexes.  As shown  in Table  6, we find that the coefficients
for the interaction  variables between the aggregate  creditor rights index  and most of the
creditor  rights subindexes  have statistically significant negative signs,  with the exception
of NO AUTOMATIC  STAY ON ASSETS, which is significantly positive.  At the same
time,  the  creditor  rights  index  and  the  subindexes  themselves  are  mostly  statistically
significantly  positive.'7 This suggests  that in countries  with high judicial  efficiency the
credible threat of speedy action by the courts combined with strong creditor rights deters
risky behavior and encourages  out-of-court  negotiations.  However, speedy action by the
courts  in  itself leads  to  more  usage  of bankruptcy,  as  does  the  presence  of stronger
creditor  rights.  This  in turn  suggests that  in  countries  with  weak judicial proceedings
creditors  will use bankruptcy - a costly resolution - only if they have strong entitlements.
In others  words,  in weak judicial  settings rights may have to be stronger to compensate
for inefficiencies  in the courts.
7 The only exception is that of the NO AUTOMATIC  STAY ON ASSETS index.
215.  Conclusion
In this paper we report the relative number of commercial  bankruptcy  filings in
35  countries.  We use this  data to investigate  which  legal,  financial  and  other  country
characteristics  affect the likelihood that a formal bankruptcy procedure is used.  We find,
correcting  for  overall  development  and  macroeconomic  shocks,  that  market-oriented
economies are more likely to use bankruptcy than bank-oriented economies.  This may be
attributed  to  the  weaker  banking  relationships  and  the  stronger  need  for  a  legal
framework to assist with coordination  among creditors.  We also find that countries with
more  efficient  and speedy  procedures to  open a  new  business  have  greater  bankruptcy
use.  This may reflect not only an overall more effective legal and regulatory process, but
also that  firm  entry  and exit  rates are  related.  And  we find that the presence  of more
small  and medium firms  is associated  with less usage of bankruptcy,  which may reflect
the costs of using formal bankruptcy procedures deterring use by smaller firms.
We find that bankruptcies  are higher in Anglo-Saxon countries,  but that stronger
creditor rights alone are not associated with more use of bankruptcy.  There are important
differences  in these effects by individual  creditor rights,  however,  and  we find that the
presence of a "no  automatic stay on assets" is associated with fewer bankruptcies  and the
presence in the law of a "restriction  on reorganizations"  with more bankruptcies.  These
results  are  also not  independent  of the  efficiency  of the judicial  system.  We  find that
greater  judicial  efficiency  is  associated  with  more  use  of bankruptcy,  but  that  the
combination  of stronger creditor  rights with greater judicial  efficiency  leads to less  use.
These  findings  suggest that there  are  important incentive  effects  of insolvency  systems
combined with good judicial  systems  encouraging  less  risky behavior and more out-of-
22court  settlements.  They also  suggest that  in countries  with  weak judicial  proceedings,
strong  creditor  rights  are  more  necessary  to  compensate  for  weaknesses  in  legal
enforcement.
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26Table 1: Summary Statistics, by Countrv
Number of Bankruptcies  was collected  from sources  listed  in Appendix  1. BNKRPT_FRM is the
ratio  of the  number  of bankruptcies  to  the  number  of firms.  Real  GDP  per  capita  in  US$
(RGDPPC), I-year growth  rates of GDP (GGDP), and real interest  rates (RINTEREST)  are from
the  International  Financial  Statistics.  Statistics  are  reported  as the  average  over the  period  of
available years.
Available  Number of  BNKRPT_  RGDPPC  GGDP  RINTEREST
Country  Years  Bankruptcies  FRM (%)  (US$,  1995)  (%)  (%)
ARGENTINA  92-99  2144.38  0.12  7,567.47  6.37  4.26
AUSTRALLA  90-99  5166.50  2.10  21,120.16  4.47  8.50
A USTRIA  90-99  2065.10  1.33  28,774.78  2.58  3.73
BELGIUM  90-99  4850.20  2.59  26,784.65  2.10  3.32
CANADA  90-98  12696.67  2.96  19,280.07  1.93  6.29
CHILE  90-99  88.60  0.28  4,195.95  7.66  13.22
COLOMBIA  96-99  225.50  0.16  2,411.81  2.81  19.99
CZECH  REP  UBLIC  92-96  1729.40  1.49  4,755.23  -0.78  -2.33
DENMARK  90-99  2375.90  1.53  33,582.58  1.93  7.77
FINLAND  90-98  5106.11  4.14  25,587.28  1.39  6.34
FRANCE  90-99  51671.75  2.62  26,293.72  1.65  6.64
GERMANY  92-98  21152.57  1.03  29,782.87  1.46  8.43
GREECE  90-94  857.4  0.29  10,987.33  1.20  9.18
HONG KONG  90-98  1205.44  0.55  22,610.76  4.98  2.33
HUNGARY  92-96  8425.40  1.99  4,252.39  -2.22  4.74
IRELAND  90-99  788.60  2.74  17,580.34  6.47  5.23
ITALY  90-96  8663.14  0.54  18,431.58  1.61  7.64
JAPAN  90-99  14000.60  0.22  41,709.64  2.18  3.61
NETHERLANDS  90-99  4154.56  1.30  9,780.62  5.75  3.29
NEW ZEALAND  93-98  716.00  3.67  27,106.94  3.44  5.63
NORWAY  90-98  3546.56  1.83  15,981.80  3.54  9.42
PERU  93-99  145.14  0.05  31,786.32  3.44  8.02
POLAND  90-96  3319.57  0.23  2,180.54  4.92  26.87
PORTUGAL  91-99  516.44  0.08  2,984.64  0.99  -5.34
RUSSIA  95-98  2770.75  0.31  10,791.99  2.73  7.95
SINGAPORE  90-99  227.80  3.06  2,274.35  -4.80  51.49
SOUTHAFRICA  90-99  2918.60  4.62  21,414.20  8.06  4.03
SOUTH  KOREA  90-98  162.67  0.17  3,944.43  1.38  6.54
SPAIN  90-99  518.60  0.02  14,764.81  2.59  5.91
SWEDEN  90-99  13917.10  7.61  27,088.16  1.36  7.57
SWITZERLAND  90-98  9212.56  3.33  44,345.91  1.08  3.71
THAILAND  90-99  346.73  0.12  2,480.25  6.03  7.34
TURKEY  98-99  1496.00  0.86  3,149.98  5.31  -5.44
UNITED KINGDOM  923-98  46583.83  1.85  18,942.57  2.61  3.75
UNITED STA TES  90-99  55752.60  3.65  27,344.91  2.97  5.56
27Table 2: Summary Statistics, by Country
D_MKTORIENT is a dummy  equal to 1 if the country  is  market-oriented  and  equal to 0  if the
country  is  bank-oriented  (Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine,  1999).  TIME is the number of business
days required  for a business to become  operational  (Djankov et al.,  2000).  SME_SHARE is the
percentage  of total employment  in the SME sector  (Kiapper and Sulla, 2002.)  RULE OF  LA W is
an  index of legal  and judicial  efficiency  (La Porta,  et al.,  1998  and Pistor,  2000.)  CREDITOR
RIGHTS is an index from I to 4 (La Porta, et al., 1998 and Pistor, 2000.)
Counry  MITORENTTU%E  SM  SARE  LEGAL  RULE  CREDITOR
Country  D  _MKTORIENT|  TIME  S  ME_SHARE  ORIGINS  OF LAW  RIGHTS
ARGENTINA  0  71  70  French  5.35  1
AUSTRALIA  1  3  40  English  10  I
AUSTRIA  0  154  57  German  10  3
BELGIUM  0  42  55  French  10  2
CANADA  1  2  56  English  10  1
CHILE  1  78  90  French  7.02  2
COLOMBIA  0  N/A  67  French  2.08  0
CZECH REPUBLIC  0  97  65  Transition  8.3  3
DENMARK  1  21  70  Scandinavian  10  3
FINLAND  0  32  45  Scandinavian  10  1
FRANCE  0  53  64  French  8.98  0
GERMANY  0  90  76  German  9.23  3
GREECE  0  53  74  French  6.18  1
HONG KONG  1  41  60  French  8.22  4
HUNGARY  0  53  64  Transition  8.7  3.75
IRELAND  0  25  50  English  7.8  1
ITALY  0  121  73  French  8.33  2
JAPAN  0  50  78  German  8.98  2
NETHERLANDS  1  68  60  French  10  2
NEW ZEALAND  0  17  54  English  10  3
NORWAY  0  24  54  Scandinavian  10  2
PERU  1  171  68  French  2.5  0
POLAND  0  26  75  Transition  8.7  2.25
PORTUGAL  0  99  70  French  8.68  1
RUSSIA  0  N/A  10  Transition  3.7  3
SINGAPORE  I  36  N/A  English  8.57  4
SOUTH AFRICA  1  30  N/A  English  4.42  3
SOUTH KOREA  1  46  82  German  5.35  3
SPAIN  0  83  70  French  7.8  2
SWEDEN  1  17  57  Scandinavian  10  2
SWITZERLAND  1  88  70  German  10  1
THAILAND  1  39  N/A  French  6.25  3
TURKEY  1  55  61  French  5.18  2
UNITED KINGDOM  I  11  43  English  8.57  4
UNITED STATES  1  7  52  English  10  1
28Table 3: Cross-Country  Regressions
The dependent variable  is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies  to the number of firms.  The
regressions  are estimated  using ordinary least squares with robust standard  errors.  LN(GDPPC)
is the log of GDP Per Capita.  GGDP is the 1-year growth rate of real GDP.  D_SYSTCRISIS  is a
dummy  equal  to  I  in  the  case  of  a  systemic  bank  crisis  (Caprio  and  Klingebiel,  2000).
RINTEREST  is  real  interest  rates.  D_MKTORIENT  is a  dummy  equal to  I  if the  country  is
market-oriented  and  equal  to  0  if the  country  is  bank-oriented  (Demirguc-Kunt  and  Levine,
1999).  TIME  is  the  number of business  days  required  for  a  business  to  become  operational
(Djankov  et al.,  2000).  SME  SHARE is the percentage  of total  employment  in the  SME sector
(Klapper and  Sulla, 2002.)  t-statistics are  in  parentheses,  *,  *,  and ***  indicate significance  at
10%,  5%, and  1% respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Base  Market  Business  With
Regression  Orientation  Entry  SMEs  Dummies
0.8904  0.1730  2.2350***  4.1320***  -0.2300
Constant  (1.53)  (0.30)  (3.73)  (5.75)  (-0.45)
0.0052***  0.0053***  0.0040***  0.0054***  -0.0034
LN(GDPPC,.,)  (5.34)  (5.78)  (4.03)  (6.26)  (-0.68)
-0.0704***  -0.1003***  -0.0994***  -0.0206  -0.0101
GGDP  ,,  (-2.59)  (-3.47)  (-3.44)  (-0.75)  (-0.52)
D SYSTCRISIS,-,  0.0692  0.3191  -0.2555  0.4553  0.7054***
D_SYSTCR!SIS,,  (0.16)  (0.77)  (-0.63)  (1.14)  (3.05)
-0.0052  -0.0087  0.0323***  -0.0199  0.0088
RINTEREST,, ](-0.63)  (-1.07)  (2.90)  (-1.62)  (1.34)
D MKTORIENT  ~~~1.1239*** D_MKTORIENT  ________  (4.98)
TIME  -0.0208***
SM  E_SHARE  -0.0576***
_  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _ _  _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  (-7  .5  4  )
Country Dummies  No  No  No  No  Yes
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adj. R-Squared  0.14  0.24  0.31  0.36  0.91
Observations  273  273  265  243  273
29Table 4: Cross-Country Regressions with Legal Orisins and Leual Efficiency
The dependent  variable  is the ratio of the  number of bankruptcies  to the number of firms.  The
regressions  are estimated using  ordinary least squares with  robust standard  errors.  LN(GDPPC)
is the log of GDP Per Capita.  GGDP  is the 1-year growth rate of real GDP.  D_SYSTCRISIS  is a
dummy  equal  to  1 in  the  case  of  a  systemic  bank  crisis  (Caprio  and  Klingebiel,  2000).
RINTEREST  is  real  interest  rates.  FRENCH,  GERMAN,  and  SCANDINAVIAN  are  dummies
indicating legal origin (La Porta, et al.,  1998). RULE OF L4 W is an assessment of the "efficiency
and integrity" of the legal environment as measure by Busines International  Corp (La Porta, et al.
1998  and Berkowitz,  et al.,  2000.)  CREDITOR RIGHTS  is  the  sum  of dummies  identifying
Restrictive  Reorganizations,  No Automatic  Stay  on  Assets,  Secured  Creditors  Paid  First,  and
Management Does Not stay in Reorganization  (La Porta, et al.,  1998 and Pistor, 2000.) t-statistics
are in parentheses, *, *,  and *** indicate significance  at 10%,  5%, and  1% respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  _(5)
Legal  ~~~~~~Legal  Creditor
Ogalin  Rule of Law  Origin and  Creditor  R  and
Origin  ~~~Rule of  Rights  Rule of Law
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  L  aw
3.1452***  -0.4398  2.8068***  0.9798*  -0.3225
Constant  (6.11)  (-0.55)  (4.53)  (1.76)  (-0.43)
0.0022***  0.0020  0.0009  0.0052***  0.0018
LN(GDPPC,,J  (2.32)  (1.57)  (0.65)  (5.33)  (1.43)
GGDPI-I  -0.0990***  -0.0560**  -0.0986***  -0.0705***  -0.0558**
GG  ,  (4.32)  (-1.93)  (4.26)  (-2.59)  (-1.92)
0.0666  0.0464  0.0657  0.0792  0.0620
D_SYSTCRlSlS,,  Z(0.19)  (0.11)  (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.15)
-0.0108*  0.0075  -0.0077  -0.0060  0.0064
RINTEREST,,  (-1.61)  (0.74)  (-1.08)  (-0.72)  (0.65)
FRENCH  -~~2.352***  -2.3323***
FRENVCH  -. 5**-.33*
r  ~~~~~(-12.64)  (-11.95)
-2.3996***  -2.2680***
GERMAeN  (-12.48)  (-10.16)
SCANDINA VUN  0. (01600***  0.2032
SCA  N DIN  A  VIA  N  ~~(0.34)  _  _  _  _  _  _  (0.44)  _  _  _  _  _
-2.4683***  -2.5908***
TRANSIT  (-5.62)  (-5.61)
CREDITOR RIGHTS  -0.0414  -0.0667
_____________________  _  __________  ____________  (-0  .5 4  )  (- 0.85  )
RULE OFLAW  0.2533***  0.0725**  0.2584***
RULE  OF  LA W  (2.89)  (2.16)  (2.81)
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adj. R-Squared  0.50  0.17  0.50  0.14  0.17
Observations  273  273  273  273  273
30Table 5: Cross-Country Regressions  with Creditor Rights and Legal Efficiency
The  dependent  variable  is  the  ratio  of the  number  of bankruptcies  to the  number  of firms.
Transition  countries  are  excluded  from  all  regressions  because  of  the  unavailability  of
disaggregated  creditor  rights.  The  regressions  are  estimated  using ordinary  least  squares  with
robust  standard errors.  LN(GDPPC) is the log of GDP Per Capita.  GGDP is the  1-year growth
rate of real  GDP.  D_SYSTCRISIS  is a dummy  equal to  1 in the case of a systemic bank  crisis
(Caprio  and Klingebiel,  2000).  RINTEREST  is  real  interest rates.  CREDITOR RIGHTS is the
sum of dummies identifying  Restrictive  Reorganizations,  No Automatic  Stay on Assets, Secured
Creditors  Paid First,  and  Management  Does Not stay in  Reorganization  (La Porta,  et al.,  1998)
RULE OF LAW  is  an  assessment  of the "efficiency  and  integrity"  of the  legal  environment  as
measure by Business Intemational Corp (La Porta, et al.  1998 and Pistor, 2000.) t-statistics  are in
parentheses,  *, *,  and ***  indicate significance  at the 10%, 5%, and  1% respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Creditor  Restrictive  No Automatic  Secured  Management
Rights  Reorganization  Asets  Paid First  Does  Not Stay
-0.3620  -0.4936  0.0931  -0.2632  -0.6489
Constant  (-0.44)  (-0.59)  (-0.11)  (-0.32)  (-0.85)
-0.0011  -0.0014  -0.0014  -0.0012  -0.0010
LN(GDPPC,1 -)  (-0.65)  (-0.82)  (-0.80)  (-0.71)  (-0.57)
-0.1040**  -0.1068***  -0.0993***  -0.1024**  -0.1060***
GGDP  ,,  (-2.44)  (-2.65)  (-2.56)  (-2.37)  (-2.55)
0.3072  0.3739  0.1153  0.3444  0.2558
D_SYSTCRISIS,.,  (0.58)  (0.72)  (0.22)  (0.64)  (0.46)
RINTEREST,_1  0.0004  -0.0007  -0.0114  -0.0025  0.0074
RINTEREST,,  (0.03)  (-0.04)  (-0.77)  (-0.16)  (0.47)
CREDITOR RIGHTS  (-0.34)1
RESTRICTIVE  0.5378**
REORGANIZATION  (2.12)
NO A UTOMA TIC STA Y  -0.9093 ***
ONASSETS  (4.75)
SECURED CREDITOR  -0.2384
PAID FIRST  (-0.77)
MANAGEMENT DOES  0.2073
NOTSTAY  (0.79)
RULE OF  LAW  0.3506***  0.3393***  0.3715***  0.3623***  0.3654***
(3.61)  (3.76)  (3.83)  (3.55)  (4.28)
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adj. R-Squared  0.18  0.20  0.23  0.18  0.18
Observations  252  252  252  252  252
31Table 6: Cross-Country Regressions with Creditor Rights and Legal Efficiencv
The dependent variable  is the ratio of the number of bankruptcies to the number of firms.  Transition
countries  are  excluded  from  all  regressions  because  of the unavailability  of disaggregated  creditor
rights.  The  regressions  are  estimated  using  ordinary  least  squares  with  robust  standard  errors.
LN(GDPPC)  is  the  log  of GDP  Per  Capita.  GGDP is  the  1-year  growth  rate  of real  GDP.
D_SYSTCRISIS  is a dummy equal to  1 in the case of a systemic bank crisis  (Caprio and Klingebiel,
2000).  RINTEREST is real  interest rates.  CREDITOR RIGHTS is the  sum of dummies identifying
Restrictive  Reorganizations,  No  Automatic  Stay  on  Assets,  Secured  Creditors  Paid  First,  and
Management  Does  Not  stay  in  Reorganization  (La  Porta,  et  al.,  1998)  RULE  OF LAW  is  an
assessment  of the  "efficiency  and  integrity"  of the  legal  environment  as  measure  by  Business
International  Corp  (La Porta,  et al.  1998  and Pistor,  2000.)  t-statistics are  in parentheses,  *,  *,  and
*** indicate significance at the  10%, 5%, and  1% respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Creditor  Restrictive  No Automatic  Creditor  Management
Rights  Reorganization  Stay on Assets  Paid First  Does  Not Stay
-2.6197***  -2.0861***  0.2174  -1.0766  -2.3879***
Constant  (-3.23)  (-3.09)  (0.24)  (-1.46)  (-3.19)
0.0010  0.0001  -0.0019  -0.003  -0.0001
LN(GDPPC,d)  (0.51)  (0.07)  (-1.09)  (-0.17)  (-0.35)
-0.0817**  -0.0669*  -0.0937  -1.011  ***  -0.0609
CGDP  ,,  (-2.07)  (-1.75)  (-2.47)  (-2.38)  (-1.52)
D SYSTCRISIS,,  0.2075  0.5557  0.2499  0.3105  0.4216
(0.38)  (1.05)  (0.48)  (0.56)  (0.80)
RINTEREST,j  0.0401*  0.0270*  -0.0184  0.0108  0.0339*
,-1  ~~~~~(1.87)  (1.68)  (-1.14)  (0.53)  _  (1.87)
CREDITOR RIGHTS  1.2829*)*  _
RESTRICTIVE  4.3785***
REORGANIZATION  (3.35)
NO AUTOMA TIC STA Y  -2.4162***
ONASSETS  (-2.95).,
SECURED CREDITOR  0.9607*
PAID FIRST  (1.76)
MANAGEMENT  DOES  4.3929***
NOTSTAY  . (3.35)
0.5479***  0.4629***  0.3499***  0.4423***  0.5273***
RULE OF  LA W  (6.10)  (6.01)  (3.53)  (5.99)  (5.77)
RULE OFLA W*  -0.1654***
CREDITOR RIGHTS  (-2.89)  .
RULE OF  LA W * RESTRICTIVE  -0.4602***
REORGANIZATION  (-2.97)
LEALITY* NO A UTOMA TIC  0.1785*
STAY ONASSETS  (1.88)
RULE OF  LA W* SECURED  -0.1579
CREDITOR PAID FIRST  (-1.12)
RULE OF  LA W* MANAGEMENT  -0.5447***
DOES NOT STA Y  (-3.30)
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adj. R-Squared  0.22  0.25  0.24  0.19  0.23
Observations  252  252  252  252  252
32APPendix  1:  Sources of Bankruptcv Data
Country  Source
A USTRALIA  Australian Securities and Investment Commission
BELGIUM  National Statistical Office
CANADA  Office of The Superintendent Of Bankruptcy
CHILE  Fiscal Nacional De Quiebras
COLOMBIA  Supersociedades
CZECHREPUBLIC  European Bank of Research and Development (EBRD)
DENMARK  Statistics Denmark
FINLAND  Statistics Finland
FRANCE  Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE)
GERMAN'Y  Wirtschaftsanalyse
GREECE  National  Statistical Service of Greece
HONG KONG  Government of Hong Kong
-HUNGARY  EBRD
IRELAND  Dept of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
ITALY  Annuario di Statisticeh Giudiziarie
JAPAN  Teikoku Data Bank
KOREA  OECD S  ecial Report
NETHERLANDS  Statistics Netherland
NEWZEALAND  NZ Insolvency  and Trustee  Service
NORWAY  Statistics Norway
PERU  INDECOFI
POLAND  EBRD
PORTUG-AL  Ministry of Justice
RUSSIA  Russian Economic Trends Quarterly - Center for Economic Reforms
SINGAPORE  Official Receiver and Public  Trustee Office, Singapore
SPAIN  National (Spanish) Statistics Institute
SWEDEN  Statistics Sweden
SWITZERLAND  Schweizerischen  Verband Creditform
THAILAND  Statistical Office
TURKEY  Government of Turkey
UNITED KINGDOM  Departmnent of Trade and Industry
UNITED STA TES  American  Bankruptcy Institute
33Appendix 2: Bankruptcv Laws on the Books
County  Liquidation  Reorganization
Procedure  Procedure
ARGENTINA  1  1
AUSTRALIA  1  1
A USTRIA  I  1
BELGIUM  1  1
CANADA  1  1
CHLE  1  1
COLOMBIA  1  I
CYPRUS  1  1
CZECHREP  1  1
DENMARK  1  1
FINLAND  1  0
FRANCE  1  1
GERMANY  1  1
HONG KONG  1  I
HUNGARY  1  1
ICELAND  1  1
IRELAND  1  1
ISRAEL  1  1
ITALY  1  1
JAPAN  1  1
NETHERLANDS  1  1
NEWZEALAND  1  0
NORWAY  1  1
PERU  1  1
POLAND  1  1
PORTUGAL  1  I  1
RUSSIANFED  1  I
SINGAPORE  1  1
SLOVAKIA  I  1
SOUTHAFRICA  I  1
SPAIN  1  1
SWEDEN  1  1
SWITZERLAND  1  1
THAILAND  1  1
TURKEY  1  1
UK  1  1
USA  1 
URUGUAY  1  1
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